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Abstract: Microprudential regulation and supervision – focused on institutional risks – cannot guarantee the stability of the financial system.
Therefore special attention should be paid to macroprudential regulation and supervision to address systemic risks. The purpose of this study
is to provide the historical context and a theoretical framework for macroprudential regulation and supervision – a new area of economic
policy. To this end, we shall examine the causes for the spread of macroprudential policy, its basic concepts, and thirdly, its place within the
scheme of economic policies.
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1. Introduction
The liberalization and deregulation pervading the regulation of financial markets in recent decades would go hand in
hand with a significant decrease in states’ ability to intervene. Due to regulatory deficiencies, supervisory authorities were
incapable of sensing the impending crisis and were also unable to handle aspects of the crisis that had been identified.
Providing a new basis for the regulation of financial markets and simultaneously strengthening supervisory competencies
have constantly been on the agenda since 2008: on the global level at the Financial Stability Board formed by the G20,
on a regional level with the European Union, as well as at the state level. An agreement has been reached between those
creating regulatory and supervisory policy, and academic representatives in that microprudential regulation and
supervision that focus on institutional risks are insufficient for ensuring the stability of the financial system; therefore
significant attention must be paid to macroprudential regulation and supervision that aim to handle systemic risks. This
policy area practically did not even exist prior to 2008 and its conceptual definition, the development of its tools as well
as its relationship to other areas of economic policy is still evolving. This study aims to present the historical and
theoretical basis for macroprudential regulation and supervision as a new field of economic policy. To this end, we shall
examine the causes for the spread of macroprudential policy, its basic concepts, and thirdly, its place within the scheme
of economic policy.1
2. Reasons for the spread of the macroprudential approach
The global economic crisis that emerged in 2008 – specifically an asset price-bubble2 at the outset – was not the first
serious setback in human history. One of the basic characteristics of the economy is that it is in constant change;
sometimes it grows, other times it begins to decline3 and this cyclicality is especially true for the workings of the financial
markets. Based on broad empirical research, Leaven and Valencia demonstrated that of the 42 banking crises occurring
between 1970 and 2007, 55% were also followed by a currency crisis; in contrast, the number of sovereign debt crises
was far lower; over half of bank crises were accompanied by another crisis (currency and banking crises). Furthermore, in
almost 11% of cases, a triple crisis occurred (i.e. currency, banking, and sovereign debt crises simultaneously).4 Distinct
risks in particular economic sectors are thus able to have an effect on the stability of the whole sector, which – due to the
interconnectedness of actors in the economy – may contaminate other sectors and thus the whole of the economy.
Therefore it is worth briefly reviewing the reasons that led to the spread of macroprudential regulation and supervision in
the financial markets.
2.1 The Glass–Steagall Act
The supervisory and regulatory side of the ‘Great Depression’ of 1929–1932 yielded numerous morals and consequences,
the causes of which are to be found in the erosion of faith in the financial markets’ flexibility and ability to self-regulate –
i.e. in the ‘invisible hand’ of the market according to Adam Smith. The Glass–Steagall Act5 enacted in 1933 made an
attempt – in order to restore faith in the banking system6 – to restrict the propensity to speculate, which can be regarded
as a basic aspect of financial markets. To this end – effectively erecting a firewall between the activities of financial
institutions –, the Glass–Steagall Act separated commercial and investment banking activities. This fundamentally meant
that if a bank accepted deposits, it could only use them for providing credit but was prohibited from trading on the stock
exchange. The Act also introduced restrictions regarding the speculative use of capital, eliminated interest on deposits
repayable on demand, introduced a deposit insurance scheme and the minimum capital requirement.7 The fundamental
aim of the Act was to prevent from hastily risking or at least seriously limit banks concerning the funds of depositors.
Consequently, the Act also tried to refrain states – i.e. taxpayers – from having to bail out troubled financial institutions
when they are near bankruptcy.
The Glass–Steagall Act placed emphasis on security, soundness, stability and avoidance of abuse amid steady growth
rather than quick but risky growth; i.e. it targeted the creation of a system of safeguards providing protection against
renewed financial crises. However, the regulations of the Glass–Steagall Act – through taking advantage of its deficiencies
– were often worked around by market participants, and constantly eroded during their time in effect.8 Firstly, the
avoidance of the separation of functions appeared in the formation of foreign subsidiaries by financial institutions, since
financial markets were significantly more deregulated in numerous jurisdictions – such as in Great Britain – than in the
USA. Secondly, commercial banks developed new instruments for investment that behaved almost like securities, while
investment banks developed products with the characteristics of loans and deposits,9 as a result of which they essentially
became each other’s competitors. A fundamental new technique serving the ‘avoidance’ of the Glass–Steagall Act became
available from the 70s when banks began to sell ‘repacked’, in other words ‘securitized’ loans – initially of high quality –
to investors in the capital markets.10 We call this the originate-to-distribute model. The essence of this practice lies in that
banks are able to transform illiquid instruments into liquid ones having a large market, while the institution originally
providing loans spreads its risk among investors.11
 
It must be stressed that – besides market actors – the central bank of the United States of America, the Federal Reserve
System (hereinafter referred to as the Fed) itself played a crucial role in the decline of the Glass–Steagall Act’s provisions
incentivizing stability. Article 20 of the Act contained a general prohibition on banks’ forming affiliations with
companies whose principal activity is securities underwriting. However, the Fed reinterpreted this prohibition in such a
way that initially 5%, then 10%, and after 1997, 25% of the total revenues of commercial banks could originate from
investment banking;12 furthermore, in 1990 it expressly permitted J. P. Morgan & Co. to underwrite securities.13
Hence the Fed, in the words of Wolfgang Reinicke, de facto overruled the Glass–Steagall Act.14 This process resulted in
the U.S. Congress having no other choice but – after several unsuccessful bills15 – to formally remove the barriers
between commercial and investment banking activity with the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999.
2.2 The consequences of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act
Uncovering the causes of the global economic crisis of 2008 is not an aim of this study,16 however, it is necessary to
point out that restrictions removed by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act in the spirit of – ‘cyclical euphoria’17 – created the
basis for the materialization of the macroeconomic risks, the mitigation of which continues to be the primary task of
economic policy to this day.
Firstly, the dissolution of the boundary between commercial and investment banking made it possible for financial
conglomerates to form enormous corporations that combine the previously separate financial activities (such as the
collection of deposits with insurance and listing securities). The risk effect of the merging of activities is connected with
financial stability, which is significant for the entirety of the economy.18 On the one hand, as a consequence of the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, such institutions were formed in great numbers that had to be saved by state capital injection
in cases of crisis due to their size and role in financial intermediation and their contribution to the national economy.
This is the so called ‘too big to fail’ problem.19 Achieving the classification of ‘too big to fail’ comes with significant
competitive advantage compared to other financial institutions as it allows for carrying out their activity, building market
positions and undertaking exaggerated risks in order to increase their profitability in the secure knowledge that the
potential costs of risky businesses and losses will always be paid by tax payers. This is the so-called moral hazard problem
that produces significant macroeconomic risks. On the other hand, activities with different aims within one institution
necessarily lead to conflicts of interest. As Marján expressed if stock analysts were in the same boat as investment bankers,
the temptation would be too big to – as it has indeed happened – endorse to investors without a second thought
corporations with known problems. Bankers would easily become accomplices of CEOs running away from problems.20
Therefore, instead of solving problems at the micro level, they added up to the macro level due to not having dealt with
them.
Secondly – strongly connected to the removal of the barrier from between commercial and investment banking – the
originate-to-distribute model formed due to securitization was seriously damaged by the originator’s failure to be
sufficiently circumspect, and spread more than just good quality mortgages among investors. Due to a relaxation of
mortgage lending conditions, increasing numbers of so-called subprime borrowers received mortgages that were then also
securitized, resulting in complex derivative securities – the risks of which could not even be assessed by the issuers
themselves in some cases. They were sold to investors, hence placing the risks off the balance sheet. As a result of this
practice, at first everyone was a winner: debtors received loans, banks issued an increasing number of loans that raised
their income, those repackaging securities got their premiums and savers realized significant returns without perceiving
risk.21 At the same time, the success of such lending formed a bubble, together with which securitization – after reaching
a ‘critical mass’ – no longer meant the spreading of risk but rather the infection of the whole financial system.
Macroeconomic risks produced as a result of the abovementioned practices highlighted the fact that the micro-level
approach to the regulation and supervision of the modern financial system, i.e. individual institutional prudence is
insufficient. The micro-level stability of the financial system before the economic crisis concealed the accumulated
systemic risks, the forecasting and management of which must be made part of the regulatory and supervisory system.
Therefore states, economic integration organizations and various international institutions are making significant efforts
globally in order to create suitable institutional frameworks and tools for the prevention, discovery and management of
systemic risks.22
3. Basic definitions of macroprudential policy
After having presented the reasons for the spread of macroprudential regulation and supervision (hereinafter referred
altogether to as macroprudential policy), we will attempt to define the basic concepts and aims of macroprudential
policy. Firstly, the origin of the term ‘macro-prudence’ must be mentioned briefly, as in spite of the need for
macroprudential approach having been brought to the fore by the present economic crisis, its appearance dates back to
much earlier.
3.1 The origin of the term ‘macro-prudence’
Uncovering the exact origin of the term macro-prudence is not an easy task, but academic literature relates its inception
to the expert work done at the Bank of International Settlements (hereinafter/henceforth referred to as BIS). Piet
Clement demonstrated that – according to BIS archives – the first appearance of the term macro-prudence in an
international context was in 1979 at a meeting of the Cooke Committee (the forerunner of the present-day Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, the BCBS), where experts discussed the hidden risks of maturity transformation in
international interbank lending.23 Because this document was an internal publication, the term was not publicized. The
first public document that specifically dealt with macroprudential policy was a report by one of BIS’s committees
(Committee on the Global Financial System).24 It was not by accident that the question of the necessity of
macroprudential policy emerged in connection with risks hidden in the derivative markets and the process of
securitization. However, ‘cyclical euphoria’ overshadowed expert proposals – in parallel with the liberalization and
deregulation of the financial markets25 – and up until the beginning of 2000, the notion of macro-prudence was only
rarely used.26 The notion’s ‘rebirth’ is traced back to a speech from September 2000 by Andrew Crockett, head of the
Financial Stability Forum.27 Crockett summarized the differences between the macro- and microprudential approaches
of regulation and supervision, and expressed his concern that in order to reach financial stability, the macroprudential
approach would be needed to be reinforced. In spite of the abovementioned, – apart from a few exceptions28 – academic
journals remained almost indifferent to macroprudential policy, as Figure 1 shows.
Figure 1: Appearances of the term ‘macro-prudence’ in academic journals based on the EBSCO EconLit database (edited by the
author)
3.2 The concept and aims of macroprudential policy
Macroprudential policy can be defined as the primary use of prudential tools to limit systemic risks and assure the
stability of the financial system. The central element of the notion of macroprudential policy is the concept of systemic
risk itself, which encompasses the decline in the provision of financial services due to the weakening of the whole or part
of the financial system in a way that this decline has a potentially profound negative effect on real economy.29 In other
words, by way of financial institutions’ risk-taking and risk-management practices, systemic risks affect the whole of the
financial system and thereby the economy as well, since through shifts in economic conditions they become internal risks
for particular market actors.30
According to academic literature, the rationale for macroprudential intervention can essentially be found in the
occurrence of externalities of the financial system stemming from systemic risks.
Firstly, externalities can arise between particular institutions of the financial system. As credit grows, there can be
excessive reliance on short-term wholesale funding provided by banks and non-bank financial institutions that exposes
the system to liquidity risk. A build-up of exposure to funding and derivative markets also goes hand in hand with the
risk of intermediaries becoming ‘too interconnected to fail’. These institutions take larger risks – relying on a state lifeline
in case of trouble – through which they gain a competitive advantage, yet they also ‘poison’ other market actors, weaken
market discipline and the incentive to appropriately control risk.31 Besides, they do not take into consideration the effect
of their own exposure on the whole system of financial services.32
 
Secondly, externality can lead to an overexposure of the system to aggregate shocks. A proven correlation exists between
credit and asset prices, resulting in widespread leverage and increases the vulnerability of the system against declines in
asset prices. Credit booms caused by competitive pressure and capital flow leading to an erosion of lending standards that
also increases the financial system’s exposure to macro shocks. At the same time, overreliance on short-term wholesale
funding exposes the system to crises of confidence.33
Thirdly, externalities can arise when the financial system amplifies adverse shocks to the economy.34 This characteristic
is referred to as pro-cyclic behavior. The most well-known form of pro-cyclic behavior is the so-called credit crunch
phenomenon, when decreasing profitability, increasing costs of external financing and exchange rate devaluation leads to
problems of capital adequacy and liquidity, to which banks react by either cutting or in extreme cases, stopping lending.
Reduction of lending leads to cuts in investments and employment that also causes serious problems in the real
economy.35 Besides the credit crunch phenomenon, we must also mention the so-called fire sale effect, when multiple
institutions start selling illiquid securities, thereby depressing prices, further weakening balance sheets and increasing the
cost of credit, applying a negative effect on the real economy.36
These externalities give rise to three objectives or ‘tasks’ for macroprudential policy. Macroprudential policy – as an
example of financial stability policy – (1) must handle structural or cross-sectoral risks, (2) must increase the resistance
and flexibility of the financial system in the face of aggregate systemic shocks, and (3) must decrease the financial
system’s pro-cyclicality, i.e. the time dimension of risks. Therefore, firstly, the task of macroprudential policy is the
handling of structural or cross-sectoral risks through the regulation of the vulnerability stemming from the
interconnections of financial intermediaries in the financial system. Secondly, its task is to increase the resilience of the
financial system to aggregate systemic shocks by building buffers that absorb their impact and help maintain the ability
of the financial system to provide credit to the economy. Thirdly, its task is to decrease the inherent pro-cyclicality of the
financial system by introducing various capital requirements, provisioning and liquidity regulations, and leverage
indicators, i.e. through administrative limits.
The objectives of macroprudential policy can primarily be realized through macroprudential regulation and
supervision. Macroprudential regulation means financial regulation that aims to control the social costs associated with
excessive balance-sheet shrinkage on the part of multiple financial institutions hit with a common shock.37 The notion
of macroprudential supervision refers to the entire process of (1) monitoring and analysis of the financial system as a whole
in order to chart vulnerabilities; (2) assessing potential threats to financial stability and deciding to take mitigating action,
(3) implementing measures to actually mitigate vulnerabilities, and (4) evaluating these actions in order to ascertain to
what extent vulnerabilities have indeed been diminished.38
Ensuring the stability of the financial system can also be achieved with approaches other than macroprudential policy,
which therefore must closely cooperate with other areas of economic policy, since the stability of the economic system
can only be maintained through harmonized coordination.
4. The place of macroprudential policy within the system of economic policies
Hence, macroprudential policy must cooperate with several other economic policy areas in order to reach its goals. Figure
2 presents the relationship between macroprudential and other policies.
Figure 2: The relationships between macroprudential and other policies (edited by the author)
4.1 The relationship of macroprudential policy and monetary policy
The most recent financial crisis completely undermined the preceding consensus and showed that price stability does not
guarantee financial or macroeconomic stability.39 Several countries had to deal with dangerous financial instability
besides extremely low inflation levels. In order to ensure macroeconomic stability, monetary policy – among others – has
to take financial stability objectives into consideration, and because of the strong connections of the two policy areas,
central banks also have to play a leading role in the realization of macroprudential policy.
Macroprudential policy and monetary policy supplement each other in a flexible way, which is especially significant
when monetary policy itself hits its limitations – as could be seen in the economic crisis of 2008.
On the one hand, – ex ante – well-calibrated and clearly communicated macroprudential policies can limit risks,
thereby easing the burden on monetary policy. Macroprudential policy may assist in the controlling of lending and
thereby affects asset prices – thus decreasing risks stemming from the formation of asset price bubbles – and can ease
asset price fluctuations originating from pro-cyclical behavior. Moreover, when macroprudential policies – ex ante –
constrain risk-taking, they reduce the risk of financial disturbances.40
 
On the other hand, macroprudential policy also provides buffers against unexpected shocks, lessening the risk of the
monetary policy’s running into its own limitation, the 0% interest rate. At times of recession, macroprudential policy can
– ex post – dampen the effect of shocks on lending and the financing of the economy by releasing these buffers, hence
supplementing the devices of monetary policy.41
4.2 The relationship between macroprudential and fiscal policies
Adequate fiscal policy plays a significant role in the avoidance of macroeconomic shocks as well as in the handling of
existing ones.
Firstly, certain types of tax may contribute to the build-up of systemic risks. Corporate taxes – as several analyses point
out42 – generally increase willingness to development using loans, as opposed to financing from capital. Many countries
do not provide tax breaks for those renting property, while providing generous relief for mortgage interest. This can be a
source of significant distortion and revenue loss, as households are encouraged to borrow against housing assets, either to
invest in non-housing assets or to finance immediate consumption. Such fiscal policy decisions can cause distortions in
the financial system that could be avoided through the creation of coordination mechanisms.
Secondly, fiscal policy can have a direct effect on risks in the financial system via taxes, levies and fees. So-called
Pigovian taxes43 (such as the bank tax) and so-called financial stability contributions44 (such as contributions paid into
resolution funds) states can influence the behavior of actors in the financial markets and at the same time can create
funds – using revenues of market actors – in order to ensure financial stability.
Thirdly, taxes affect asset prices in that a newly introduced tax decreases an asset’s price by decreasing the profitability
of the asset. Therefore, in periods of prosperity, fiscal policy can be used to prevent the development of asset price
bubbles.
4.3 The relationship of macroprudential and microprudential policies
One main lesson of the economic crisis has been that although microprudential regulation is necessary, it is not sufficient
for a stable operation of the financial system since the latter is much more than the sum of its financial institutions. In
order to defend against losses stemming from systemic risks, the institutional approach in itself is not enough; therefore,
the policy areas representing two different perspectives must cooperate closely. The comparison of macro- and
microprudential policy can be seen in Table 1.
Table 1: Comparison of macro and microprudential perspectives45




Immediate objective Limit financial system-wide distress and systemicrisk
Limit individual risks, decreasing threats affecting
individual institutions
Ultimate objective Avoid output costs Consumer protection
Type of risk (Partly) Endogenous: result of the commonbehavior of individual institutions
Exogenous: they can be regarded as a given in
relation to individual institutions
Correlations and common
exposures across institutions Important Irrelevant
Calibration of prudential controls In terms of system-wide risks: top-down In terms of risks for individual institutions: bottom-up
 
It can be seen from the comparison that while microprudential policy contributes to the stability of the financial market
It can be seen from the comparison that while microprudential policy contributes to the stability of the financial market
through the prevention and discovery of institutional risks, macroprudential policy does so via the prevention and
discovery of systemic risks. Therefore sharing information and the joint analysis of risks, as well as tight communication
are necessary to realize the supplementary benefits. Besides close cooperation, there must also be mechanisms in place
that are able to resolve conflicts arising from differing perspectives and objectives – mainly occurring at times of
economic shock. Regardless of their distinct approaches, macroprudential and microprudential policies both deliver their
effects through the same transmission mechanism. During periods of ‘good times’, the microprudential authority
probably agrees with the formation of buffers being a prudent behavior, even if the ratio of credit default is low and
profitability is high. However, in ‘bad times’, tension may increase between the two policy areas, as the macroprudential
authority – in order to break pro-cyclicality – would like to ease regulatory conditions in order to avoid a credit crunch
and a fire sale, while the micro-prudential authority would tighten requirements to protect depositors and investors.46 In
order to resolve conflicts, it needs to be clarified which perspective should have priority at which times.
4.4 The relationship of macroprudential policy, crisis management and resolution policy
Crisis management and resolution policy also supplement macroprudential policy. Macroprudential policy averts risks
threatening financial stability as a ‘first line of defense’ by identifying and managing them. However, in practice all
threats cannot be averted, therefore, the macroprudential authority increases resilience of the financial system as a ‘second
line of defense’. At the inception of a crisis, when the system is not able to neutralize shocks, crisis management and
resolution are the final, ‘third line of defense’ for maintaining financial stability.47 The establishment of crisis
management and resolution systems, recognizing the unsustainability of national bailout actions,48 aims at the regulated
removal of a failing financial institution from the market in order to maintain financial stability. An effective and
credible crisis management and resolution system may support the realization of the objectives of macroprudential policy
by reinforcing market discipline.49
4.5 The relationship between macroprudential and competitive policies
The freedom of economic competition originates from the theoretical consensus that competition ensures cost efficiency,
the ongoing improvement of the quality and standards of goods and services: all in all, greater efficiency. When carrying
out financial activity, intensive competition often incentivizes financial institutions to take excessive risks and grow too
fast, and mergers can result in institutions too large in size, carrying in them systemic risks.50 Because of this, tension
may arise between the objectives of competition policy and financial stability: the assurance of fair competition may
conflict with ensuring financial stability. In order to avoid tension, it is necessary to establish that in relation to the
financial sector, the scrutiny of economic competition must be supplemented with a macroprudential perspective. In
order to achieve this, certain elements of traditional competition law enforcement (such as authorization, investigation of
effective control, merger approval) have been assigned to the macroprudential supervisory authorities in several countries.
Other countries implemented strict coordination and consultation mechanisms between the two policy areas and have
incorporated financial stability and as a secondary aim into the mission statement of competition authorities.
5. Summary
The global economic crisis has brought into sharp focus the fact that as a result of financial globalization – which
primarily manifests itself in the form of the liberalization and deregulation of the financial system – financial institutions
are intricately intertwined, leading to the appearance at the global level of instability in the financial system – the so
called poisoning effect. Even before the symbolic start of the crisis (the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers), Rajan had
already pointed out that the international financial system, the capital and money markets had built up new risks that
were not seen by anybody, could not be assessed but still they existed.51 Macroprudential policy specifically aims to
forecast, identify and manage these systemic risks pent up in the financial system. Macroprudential policy has to handle
structural risks, increase the resilience and flexibility of the financial system against shocks, and decrease the financial
system’s pro-cyclicality, i.e. the time dimension of risks. Ensuring financial stability – and thereby economic stability –
cannot be achieved by macroprudential policy alone; therefore, it is essential that it may operate in close cooperation
with other economic policy areas.
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